Part 8: The Complex History of Islamic Extremism and Russia's Contribution to the Rise of Al Qaeda and ISIS

Moscow backs a third coup in Afghanistan in a last-ditch effort to stabilize the situation. On February 15, 1989, the last Russian soldier leaves Afghanistan in defeat.

The Soviet 40th Army withdraws from Afghanistan into Soviet Uzbekistan on 15 February 1989

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This is part eight of a multi-report series that explains the rise of modern Islamic extremism. From 1951 to 2021, a series of key geopolitical events, many independent of each other, caused the Islamic Revolution, the rise of Al Qaeda and ISIS, the creation and collapse of the caliphate, and the reconstitution of ISIS as the ISKP. While Western influence and diplomatic blunders are well-documented throughout this period, the Soviet Union and the Russian Federation are equally culpable. The editors would like to note that a vast majority of the 1.8 billion people who are adherents to some form of Islam are peaceful and reject all forms of religious violence.

If you missed the previous installment, part seven is available.

President Ali Khamenei of Iran tours his troops during the Iraq-Iran War in August 1988 - Photographer unknown - License Under Creative Commons

Moscow forces the replacement of their puppet leader in Afghanistan as the Soviet Army struggles to find the exit

When the Soviets assassinated Hafizullah Amin on December 27, 1979, and installed Babrak Karmal as their puppet leader, KGB head Yuri Andropov advocated for Mohammad Najibullah to be installed as the head of the state security services of Afghanistan - the KhAD. After his appointment, Andropov immediately started an influence campaign to convince Soviet General Secretary Leonid Brezhnev and Amin to support expanding Najibullah’s power, which earned him a seat in the Afghanistan Politburo.

When Najibullah took over the KhAD in 1980, he was responsible for 120 people. Six years later, the KhAD was an independent government Ministry with 30,000 highly paid employees trained by KGB advisors. Most of the budget came from the Soviet Union, and shortly after Andropov became the General Secretary of the Soviet Union in November 1983, he started laying the groundwork to replace Karmal with his protege, Najibullah.

During the six years Najibullah led the KhAD, over 16,000 extrajudicial executions were carried out, and 100,000 were imprisoned. Afghan intelligence tortured peasants and tribesmen, burned villages, killed livestock, and destroyed crops in an attempt to identify members of the mujahideen. In the cities, anti-communists, intellectuals, professors, doctors, and educated professionals were threatened, assassinated, falsely imprisoned, and executed. Flush with funds from the Soviet Union and under Najibullah’s leadership, the KhAD was wildly corrupt.

When Mikhail Gorbachev became General Secretary in 1985, he continued to follow the path laid out by Andropov, believing that after the Soviet withdrawal, Najibullah would emerge as a stronger leader loyal to Moscow. The Main Defense Intelligence Directorate of the Soviet Union (GRU) disagreed. In their assessment, Najibullah would be even more polarizing than Karmal and would struggle to build a strong coalition with the various Afghan tribal warlords. Gorbachev was unmoved.

Soviet Union soldiers in Kabul, Afghanistan -1986
Credit – Photographer unknown – public domain

Moscow hoped that their newly installed leader could bring the fractured Afghanistan nation to reconciliation and allow a graceful exit of Soviet troops. On May 4, 1986, Najibullah was made the General Secretary of the Afghanistan Politburo, with Karmal remaining as the Chairman of the Revolutionary Council. The assessment by the GRU that ethnic Uzbeks, Tajiks, and Pashtuns would resist cooperating with Najibullah, and the armed factions fighting against Soviet troops would reject him, was accurate. Additionally, Karmal fought back, openly questioning Najibullah’s loyalty to Afghanistan, exposing his trail of corruption, and the spread of misinformation.

Najibullah complained to Moscow that Karmal was interfering with his rule and asked for guidance, with Gorbachev deciding on a non-violent solution. In November 1986, Karmal was dismissed from the Revolutionary Council and exiled to Moscow. The Kremlin now viewed the reconciliation strategy as a failure and decided that negotiating a peace agreement was the best option. Gorbachev also believed that, due to the improving relationship with the United States, he could push for more favorable terms.

In March 1987, the first round of U.N.-sponsored peace talks between Pakistan and Afghanistan was held in Geneva, Switzerland, with the U.S. and the Soviet Union as guarantors. Pakistan negotiators refused to meet with the Afghanistan delegation because they did not recognize the Soviet-backed and controlled government as legitimate. The first round of negotiations failed, with Pakistan refusing to agree to a 16-month timetable for a controlled withdrawal of Soviet troops, demanding it be eight months. Additionally, the Soviets requested the immediate cessation of U.S. arms shipments and financial support to the Afghan resistance as a precondition for their withdrawal. Washington refused.

In July, Najibullah made a secret trip to Moscow to meet with Gorbachev. The Soviet leader pressed him to implement additional government reforms, hoping that the dead reconciliation plan could be revived. Gorbachev’s council was undermined by the KGB, which advised Najibullah not to implement some of the suggested reforms.

Returning to Afghanistan, Najibullah announced that single-party rule would come to an end. However, there were tight restrictions on what political platforms would be acceptable. New parties were required to want to maintain relations with the Soviet Union, had to be Muslim, and had to oppose colonialism, imperialism, Zionism, racial discrimination, apartheid, and fascism. The mujahideen and all but one armed faction fighting against the Soviet-backed Afghan government boycotted the August elections. Still, several new leftist parties were formed and were able to gain a handful of government seats.

In September, a second round of peace talks was held in Geneva. While progress was made in establishing the legitimacy of the Afghan government, no progress was made in establishing a timetable for the Soviet withdrawal, and the U.S. again refused to end military and financial aid before the Soviet troop withdrawal was complete.

In November, during the Afghanistan Politburo conference, Najibullah proposed accelerating the timetable for the Soviet withdrawal from 16 months to 12. A new constitution was approved, creating the office of the President. On November 30, Najibullah, running unopposed, was elected president of Afghanistan. Under the mandate of the new constitution, the Revolutionary Council would be dissolved and replaced with a General Assembly elected by the people.

On February 8, 1988, Soviet negotiators announced a conditional date of withdrawal from Afghanistan, hoping that the U.S. would agree to the immediate end of military and financial aid to the Afghan rebels. Washington rejected the proposal. With the domestic situation in the Soviet Union deteriorating, Gorbachev decided that an unfavorable peace deal was better than remaining in Afghanistan.

On April 14, Pakistan, Afghanistan, the Soviet Union, and the U.S. signed the Geneva Accords. Pakistan and Afghanistan agreed to non-interference and non-intervention, and Pakistan agreed to stop the flow of weapons across its border. The Soviet Union committed to starting the withdrawal of the 40th Combined Arms Army on May 15 and completing it by February 15, 1989. Moscow dropped the requirement for the U.S. to end military and financial aid.

On February 15, 1989, the last column of BTR-80 armored personnel carriers of the Soviet 40th Combined Arms Army crossed the Friendship Bridge into Soviet Uzbekistan. General Boris Gromov symbolically walked behind the troops, becoming the last Soviet soldier to leave. Mobbed by reporters, he cursed profusely, later explaining that his anger was directed at “the leadership of the country, at those who start the wars while others have to clean up the mess.”

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Coming Up Next, Part 9: The Soviet defeat and withdrawal from Afghanistan turn Osama bin Laden into a cult of personality, as Islamic extremists flock to his new organization, al-Qaeda. Saudi Arabian and U.S. intelligence officials start to fear they have lost control of their go-between and intelligence source. From Cairo to Kabul, tension was building.